Supporting weakly Pareto optimal allocations in infinite dimensional nonconvex economies by Florenzano, Monique et al.
Supporting weakly Pareto optimal allocations in infinite
dimensional nonconvex economies
Monique Florenzano, Pascal Gourdel, Alejandro Jofre´
To cite this version:
Monique Florenzano, Pascal Gourdel, Alejandro Jofre´. Supporting weakly Pareto optimal
allocations in infinite dimensional nonconvex economies. Economic Theory, Springer Verlag,
2006, 29 (3), pp.549-564. <10.1007/s00199-005-0033-y>. <halshs-00086819>
HAL Id: halshs-00086819
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00086819
Submitted on 21 Jul 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
SUPPORTING WEAKLY PARETO OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS IN INFINITE
DIMENSIONAL NONCONVEX ECONOMIES∗
MONIQUE FLORENZANO1, PASCAL GOURDEL2, AND ALEJANDRO JOFRE´3
1 CNRS–CERMSEM, UMR CNRS 8095, Universite´ Paris 1, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital,
75647 Paris Cedex 13, FRANCE; monique.florenzano@univ-paris1.fr
2 CERMSEM, UMR CNRS 8095, Universite´ Paris 1, 106-112 boulevard de l’Hoˆpital,
75647 Paris Cedex 13, FRANCE; gourdel@univ-paris1.fr
3 Centro de Modelamiento Matematico, UMR CNRS 2071, Universidad de Chile,
Blanco Encalada 2120, Casilla 170, Correo 3, Santiago, CHILE; ajofre@dim.uchile.cl
Abstract. In this paper, we prove a new version of the Second Welfare Theorem for nonconvex
economies with a finite number of agents and an infinite number of commodities, that is when the
preference correspondences are not convex-valued and/or when the total production set is not
convex. For this kind of nonconvex economies, a recent result, obtained by one of the authors,
introduces conditions which, when applied to the convex case, give for Banach commodity spaces
the well-known result of decentralization by continuous prices of Pareto-optimal allocations under
an interiority condition. In this paper, in order to prove a different version of the Second Welfare
Theorem, we reinforce the conditions on the commodity space, assumed here to be a Banach
lattice, and introduce a nonconvex version of the properness assumptions on preferences and the
total production set. Applied to the convex case, our result becomes the usual Second Welfare
Theorem when properness assumptions replace the interiority condition. The proof uses a Hahn-
Banach Theorem generalization by Borwein and Jofre´ which allows to separate nonconvex sets
in general Banach spaces.
JEL Classification numbers: D51, D6
Keywords and phrases: second welfare theorem, nonconvex economies, Banach spaces, subdif-
ferential, Banach lattices, properness assumptions.
1. Introduction
For convex economies with given technological and resource limitations, individual needs and
tastes, the second welfare theorem states that every Pareto optimal allocation can be supported by
a non-zero price vector such that each consumer minimizes his expenditure over his preferred set
and each firm maximizes its profit. Translated in mathematical terms, it means that the supporting
price vector belongs to the normal cone (in the sense of convex analysis) to the total production
set at the production component of the optimal allocation while its opposite belongs to the normal
cone to each preferred set at the corresponding consumption component of the allocation.
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In an infinite dimensional setting, that is for economies with infinitely many commodities, the
result first appeared in a seminal paper of Debreu (1954) [10] where the commodity space is a
topological vector space. Besides convexity hypothesis, a key assumption of Debreu’s result is that
the total production set of the economy has a nonempty interior, an assumption strongly related by
him with free-disposal in commodities, which clearly reduces the application of the result to ordered
topological vector commodity spaces whose positive orthant has a nonempty interior. A simple
look to Debreu’s proof, based on the Hahn-Banach theorem, allows for noticing that the interiority
assumption could be likewise done for anyone of the preferred sets. However, given the assumptions
currently used for guaranteeing the existence of Pareto optimal allocations, such an assumption
would equally be suited for commodity spaces whose positive cone has a nonempty interior but,
as previously, would prevent any application of the result to a number of commodity spaces which
have been found of economic interest. This limitation explains why, thirty two years after, Debreu’s
result was revisited by Mas-Colell (1986) [23] who replaces Debreu’s interiority condition by the
so-called properness assumptions on preferences and production, at the cost of strengthening the
assumptions made on the commodity space which is assumed in [23] to be a topological vector
lattice and on the consumption sets restricted to coincide with the positive orthant. As in Debreu
[10], the weak optimum is supported by a non-zero, continuous linear functional p called “valuation
functional”. Moreover, p(ω) > 0 if the total initial endowment, ω > 0, is the common properness
vector.
Recall that the interest for nonconvex economies, an old interest in Economics, arises on the
production side from the consideration of increasing returns to scale and/or of certain external-
ities. On the consumption side, besides all forms of indivisibilities that we postulate away in
this paper, nonconvex preferences correspond, as in Starr [31], to anti-complementarities1 between
commodities, for example to non-aversion to risk for agents facing uncertainty. The reasons for
considering nonconvex models in an infinite dimensional commodity space are not different. For a
general study of the infinite dimensional spaces of interest in Economics, we refer the reader to the
survey of Mas-Colell and Zame [24] in the Handbook of Mathematical Economics. Let us simply
observe here that in a dynamic setting, technological change and the introduction of new goods
and production processes should contribute to yield a nonconvex total production set. In the same
way, whatever may be the formalization of uncertainty with an infinite dimensional space of states
of nature (probability space or simply measurable space), the study of finance models with non
convex preferences should allow to take into account the fact that a substantial fraction of the
investors exhibit some uncertainty (or risk) appeal.
When the preferred sets and/or the aggregate production set are nonconvex, it is not always
possible to find prices for which consumer and producer choices at a Pareto optimal allocation are
truly optimal. An equilibrium notion is then defined where prices are such that choices satisfy
the first order conditions for optimality written in terms of normal cones to the preferred and
production sets. As well-known, even in a finite dimensional setting, several notions of normal
cone have been used. Each one has a different implication for the economic significance of the
decentralization result.2 But whatever be the used notion of normal cone, on the production side,
the first order conditions are interpreted as pricing rules for the nonconvex firms allowing the
economy as a whole to achieve efficient allocations through a mechanism that is as decentralized as
1Arrow–Hahn [4]write that “some pairs of commodities may be antagonistic in consumption”.
2Think for example of Clarke’s normal cone used by most of authors to study equilibrium in production with
increasing returns, compared to the one used by Guesnerie [12] that can be interpreted in terms of cost minimization
if the set of input combinations that produce a given level of output is convex.
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possible. On the consumption side, when preferences are not convex valued, rather than first order
conditions, the Shapley-Folkman theorem is often used by economists to exhibit an approximate
expenditure minimizing behavior (see [3] and its references). In Jofre–Rivera [18], an analogue
interpretation is given using the normal cone defined in their paper.
In an infinite dimensional setting, several works on decentralization of Pareto optimal allocations
have solved the question of its extension to nonconvex economies (for recent results at a level of
generality comparable to Debreu [10] or Mas-Colell [23], see mainly Bonnisseau-Cornet (1988)
[5], Mordukhovich (2001) [26], Jofre´ (2000) [17]). The three above quoted papers differ by the
commodity space they consider: a topological vector space in [5], an Asplund space3 in [26], a
general Banach space in [17], and the normal cone used for generalizing the normal cone of convex
analysis: Clarke’s normal cone in [5], Mordukhovich’s normal cone in [26], Ioffe’s normal cone in
[17]. In view of convexity of Clarke’s tangent and normal cones, the separation tool used in [5] is
the Hahn-Banach theorem, while [26] and [17] use variational generalizations of the Hahn-Banach
theorem, respectively an “extremal principle” due to Mordukhovich–Shao [27] and a “nonconvex
separation property” due to Borwein-Jofre´ [6]. [17] and [26] have in common an asymptotic (net
demand qualification) condition which, used jointly with the separation argument, allows to prove
“viscous” or “approximate” versions of the second welfare theorem. When an additional condition,
called compactly epi-Lipschitzianity, is introduced on one of the preferred or production sets then
the approximate decentralization becomes exact, that is, there exists a price vector belonging to
a suitable normal cone (or its opposite) to the preferred and production sets at the corresponding
component of the Pareto optimal allocation. The three papers have in common4 this assumption
which generalizes to the non-convex case the interiority condition of Debreu [10]. In its own setting,
each one is up to now the best extension of Debreu’s paper.5
The aim of this paper is to extend Mas-Colell’s result to nonconvex economies defined on Banach
commodity spaces. We introduce properness conditions on preferred and production sets analogue
to the ones used by Mas-Colell. They can be given an analogue interpretation and allow to ‘support
with prices local weak Pareto optimal allocations. Properness assumptions require (in the proof
of our result) a topological vector lattice structure on the commodity space and consumption sets
restricted to the positive orthant, in order to use the decomposition property of vector lattices
and solidness of zero neighborhoods. It then appears that properness conditions joint with a non-
satiation assumption, natural in this problem, give us for free the the asymptotic condition used
in [5], [26], [17], so that we can apply the “viscous” separation property of Borwein-Jofre´ [6]. Also
thanks to the properness assumptions, we can go from an approximate to an exact decentralization
result without assuming any (compactly) epi-Lipschitzianity of one of the preferred or production
sets. The supporting vector price is obtained in any normal cone satisfying some convenient
properties.
It is worth noticing that preferences need not be transitive or complete and are defined for each
consumer by (strictly) preferred sets. We do not make any monotonicity assumption on preferences
or free-disposal assumption on production and get a decentralization result as well for production
3Asplund spaces are Banach spaces on which every continuous convex function is generically Fre´chet differen-
tiable. Particular examples are all reflexive Banach spaces and all Banach spaces with separable duals.
4In [5], compactly epi-Lipschitzianity is replaced by epi-Lipschitzianity, a stronger assumption which guarantees
also that the asymptotic condition is satisfied.
5We do not include in this comparison papers of historical interest as Khan–Vohra (1988) [20] and Khan (1991)
[19] which use in several respects stronger assumptions. We also omit Mordukhovich (2000) [25] which extends and
slightly generalizes Jofre´ (2000) to several local Pareto optimality notions.
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economies as for pure exchange economies. As we strengthen some assumptions and weaken some
other ones, this result should be considered as a complement more than a substitute to Jofre´’s
paper. Applied to the convex case, it has as corollary the usual second welfare theorem in Banach
commodity lattices when properness assumptions replace the interiority condition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls definitions and properties of subdifferential
and normal cone which will be used later and, in order to prepare the comparison with previous
results (see Remark 3.7), definitions and properties of (compactly) epi-Lipschitz sets. Section 3
describes the model, posits the main assumptions and states the main results. Section 4 is devoted
to proofs.
2. Mathematical preliminaries
Let X be a Banach space, X∗ its topological dual . For x ∈ X and p ∈ X∗, we note p · x the
evaluation p(x). In what follows, B and B∗ denote respectively the open unit-ball of X and the
open unit-ball of X∗, B(x, ε) the open ball with center x and radius ε. Given a set S ⊂ X, dS(x)
denotes the distance from x to S defined in the given norm by
dS(x) := inf
y∈S
‖x− y‖
and
χS(x) :=
{
0 if x ∈ S
+∞ if x /∈ S
denotes the indicator function of S; intS, clS and bdS denote the interior, the closure and the
boundary of S.
If A is a subset of X∗, cl∗A denotes the closure of A for the weak-star topology σ(X∗, X).
2.1. Subdifferentials and normal cones. By a subdifferential, we mean any set-valued mapping
which associates with every lower semicontinuous extended-real-valued function f defined on X
and any x ∈ X a set ∂f(x) ⊂ X∗. For any f, g X → R locally Lipschitz functions and any point
x ∈ X, we require the following list of properties:
(a) ∂f(x) = ∅ when x /∈ dom(f);
(b) ∂f(x) = ∂g(x) if f and g coincide in a neighborhood of x;
(c) ∂f is the classical subdifferential whenever f is a convex function;
(d) if f and g are locally Lipschitz and if x is a local minimum of f + g, then 0 ∈ ∂(f + g)(x) ⊂
∂f(x) + ∂g(x);
(e) if k is the constant of Lipschitz of f near x, then ‖p‖ ≤ k for all p ∈ ∂f(x);
(f) given closed subsets Z1, Z2 of X, the function h : Z1 × Z2 → R defined by h(z1, z2) =
f1(z1) + f2(z2) satisfies ∂h(z1, z2) ⊂ ∂f1(z1)× ∂f2(z2);
(g) given A : X → Y , a bounded linear operator defined from a Banach space X onto a Banach
space Y , A∗ its adjoint, λ > 0, and b ∈ Y , if f(x) = λg(Ax+ b) where g is locally Lipschitz, then
∂f(x) = λA∗∂g(Ay + b).
The subdifferential is said to be robust on a class of functions if, for any function f of this class,
the set-valued mapping x→ ∂f(x) has a closed graph in X ×X∗ when X and X∗ are respectively
endowed with the norm-topology and the weak-star topology σ(X∗, X).
If S ⊂ X, the normal cone to S at x ∈ S associated with the given subdifferential is defined as
the subdifferential of the indicator function of S at x:
NS(x) = ∂χS(x).
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That the previous list of properties, sufficient for our purposes, is nonvacuous and consistent is
verified by the fact that a number of subdifferentials, in particular the approximate subdifferential,
as defined by Ioffe in [16], satisfy (a)–(g)6. Moreover, the approximate subdifferential is robust on
locally Lipschitz functions, a property which plays a fundamental role in our result. IfX is Asplund
and f Lipschitz near x, the approximate subdifferential of f at x coincides with Mordukhovich’s
subdifferential when Mordukhovich’s subdifferential is robust, in particular if X is reflexive or
separable (see Section 9 of [27]). If f is Lipschitz near x, Clarke’s subdifferential of f at x is the
weak-star closed convex hull of the approximate subdifferential of f at x (see Theorem 7.2 of [15]).
2.2. Epi-Lipschitz sets. We recall that a subset Z of a (nonnecessarily complete) normed space
X is called epi-Lipschitz at z ∈ clZ with respect to d ∈ X if there exists some εz > 0 , αz > 0 and
δz > 0 and a point (a direction) d ∈ X satisfying
Z ∩ (z + εzB) + t(d+ δzB) ⊂ Z, ∀t ∈ [0, αz].
A set Z epi-Lipschitz at z if it is epi-Lipschitz with respect to some d. Finally, Z is epi-Lipschitz
if it is epi-Lipschitz at every element z in clZ.
The following proposition summarizes the properties of epi-Lipschitz convex sets in normed
spaces.
Proposition 2.1 (Rockafellar [30]). Assume that X is a normed space and Z is a subset of X.
a) If Z is epi-Lipschitz at some z ∈ clZ, then intZ is nonempty. If, conversely, intZ is nonempty
and Z is convex then Z is epi-Lipschitz.
b) Consequently, if Z ⊂ Z ′, Z is epi-Lipschitz at some z ∈ clZ and Z ′ is convex then Z ′ is
epi-Lipschitz.
Proof. a) is proved in [5] in the case X is a topological vector space, for the corresponding
notion of epi-Lipschitzianity.
The proof of b) is obvious.
We will use in this paper a “viscous” separation theorem in Banach spaces obtained by Borwein
and Jofre´ [6] using the Ekeland variational principle and the properties (a) – (f) of the subdiffer-
ential of the distance function. We recall now its statement.
Theorem 2.1. Let Z1, . . . , Zn be closed subsets of a Banach space X and let (z1, . . . , zn)∈ Z1 ×
. . .× Zn be such that
n∑
i=1
zi ∈ bd(
n∑
i=1
Zi).
There exists c > 0 such that for any ε > 0 there exist zi ∈ (zi + εB) and p
∗ ∈ X∗ such that
p∗ ∈
n⋂
i=1
(∂dZi(zi) + εB
∗) and 0 < c ≤ ‖p∗‖ ≤ 1.
6Proofs of the different properties for the approximate subdifferential can be found in [13] [14] [15] [16]. The
reader has to be cautious with the fact that the terminology used evolves from one paper to another in the different
papers of Ioffe quoted in our list of references.
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3. The economic model and results
Let L be a Banach lattice, L∗ be its topological dual. On L as commodity space, we consider an
economy consisting of a finite set M = {1, . . . ,m} of consumers and, for the sake of simplicity, one
producer. Each consumer i is described by a consumption set Xi ⊂ L, a preference correspondence
Pi :
∏
k∈M Xk → Xi, satisfying xi /∈ Pi(x) for every x ∈
∏
k∈M Xk. If x ∈ X :=
∏
k∈M Xk, Pi(x)
is interpreted as the set of those consumptions in Xi which are (strictly) preferred by agent i to xi
when the consumption of each agent k 6= i is equal to xk. The set Y ⊂ L is the (total) production
set. The aggregate endowment is denoted by ω ∈ L+. To summarize, the economy E is defined by
the following list:
E =
(
< L,L∗ >, (Xi, Pi)i∈M , Y, ω
)
.
Let A(E) be the set of all attainable allocations of the economy E , that is:
A(E) = {(x, y) ∈ (
∏
i∈M
Xi)× Y |
∑
i∈M
xi = y + ω}.
In the following, AX(E) will denote the projection of A(E) on X =
∏
i∈M Xi.
Definition 3.1. (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(E) is a weak Pareto optimal allocation for the economy E if there
does not exist any x ∈ AX(E) such that xi ∈ Pi(x
∗) for all i ∈M .
The concern of this paper is with the decentralization by prices (in a sense to be precised later)
of weak locally Pareto optimal allocations whose we give now the precise definition.
Definition 3.2. (x∗, y∗) ∈ A(E) is a weak locally Pareto optimal allocation for the economy E if
for each i = 1, . . . ,m, there exists some neighborhood Ui of x
∗
i such that there does not exist any
x ∈ AX(E) satisfying xi ∈ (Pi(x
∗) ∩ Ui) for all i ∈M .
The set of weak locally Pareto optimal allocations obviously contains the set of weak Pareto
optimal allocations. When individual preferences are strictly quasi-convex, the local notions of
optimality coincide with the global ones.
We thus start with a weak locally Pareto optimal allocation (x∗, y∗) and make on E the following
assumptions:
A.1: ∀i ∈ M , Xi = L+, x
∗
i ∈ clPi(x
∗) and there exist δx∗
i
> 0, λx∗
i
> 0 and θx∗
i
> 0 such
that
L+ ∩
(
(Pi(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θx∗i )) + Γx∗i
)
⊂ Pi(x
∗)
where Γx∗
i
denotes the set Γx∗
i
:=
⋃
λ∈]0,λx∗
i
] λ
(
(1/(m+ 1))ω + δx∗
i
B
)
;
A.2: Y is norm-closed and there exist δy∗ > 0, λy∗ > 0, and θy∗ > 0 such that
∀y ∈ Y ∩B(y∗, θy∗),
(
(y − Γy∗) ∩ {z ∈ L | z
+ ≤ y+}
)
⊂ Y
where Γy∗ denotes the set Γy∗ :=
⋃
λ∈]0,λy∗ ]
λ
(
(1/(m+ 1))ω + δy∗B
)
.
Remarks 3.3.
(a) The formulation of (1/(m+1))ω-properness of preferences in Assumptions A.1 is local and
close to the one given by Podczeck [28] in the convex case. It implies that ω > 0 and is
implied by the more classical assumption
L+ ∩
(
Pi(x
∗
i ) +K
∗
i
)
⊂ Pi(x
∗
i )
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where K∗i is the whole open cone generated by Γx∗i . When preferred sets are derived from a
transitive and complete preference relation on consumption sets, properness at some point
of the consumption set is implied by uniform properness as formulated by Mas-Colell [22].
To be restricted to consumption sets equal to the positive cone of the commodity space is
a counterpart for using properness.
(b) As proved in Proposition 4.1, local properness at x∗ of preferred sets, as stated in A.1,
is equivalent to the assumption that each Pi(x
∗) is the trace on L+ of some set, P̂i(x
∗),
epi-Lipschitz at x∗i with respect to ω:
∀i ∈M, Pi(x
∗) = P̂i(x
∗) ∩ L+.
In the convex case, Tourky [32] states an analogous condition.
(c) In A.2, we follow (and weaken) Richard [29] for formulating the local properness of a
production set at some point of this set. It is well-known that properness as defined
by Richard is weaker than the definition first given by Mas-Colell [23]. Here, the local
properness of Y at y∗ ∈ Y , as stated in A.2, is implied by the assumption that
Y = Ŷ (y∗) ∩ Zy∗
for some set, Ŷ (y∗), epi-Lipschitz at y∗ with respect to −ω, and some closed pretechnology
sublattice7 of L, Zy∗ , comprehensive (Zy∗−L+ = Zy∗), containing 0 and such that Y ⊂ Zy∗ .
In the convex case, Tourky [33] states an analogous condition.
(d) The free-disposal production set Y = −L+ satisfies A.2, but Y = {0} does not satisfies
A.2. Hence the assumptions made in this paper do not cover the case of a pure exchange
economy without disposal. The supportability by prices of a pure exchange economy will
be established as a corollary of the main result of this paper we next present.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that ∂ is any subdifferential satisfying the properties (a) – (g) and robust
for distance functions. Let (x∗, y∗) be a weak locally Pareto optimal allocation of an economy E
satisfying at (x∗, y∗) the assumptions A.1, A.2. There exists a price p∗ ∈ L∗ (the topological dual
of L), p∗ 6= 0, such that
a) p∗ ∈ ∂dY (y
∗),
b) −p∗ ∈
⋂
i∈M ∂dcl
(
Pi(x∗)
)(x∗i ).
Moreover, p∗ · ω > 0.
Remark 3.5.
It is not necessary to assume as in A.1 and A.2 that
(
1/(m+1)
)
ω is a common properness vector.
Replacing (1/m+1)ω in the definition of Γx∗
i
, i ∈M and Γy∗ respectively by some vx∗
i
> 0, i ∈M
and vy∗ > 0 and rewriting the proof of Claim 4.1 below would allow us to prove the existence of
p∗ satisfying a) and b) and p∗ · (
∑
i∈M vx∗i + vy∗) > 0.
In the case of an exchange economy, we state:
Corollary 3.6. Assume that ∂ is any subdifferential satisfying the properties (a) – (g) and robust
for distance functions. Let x∗ be a weak locally Pareto optimal allocation of an economy E satisfying
7A slightly weaker assumption would be Zy∗ is a comprehensive subset of L, satisfying for all z ∈ Zy∗ , z
+ ∈ Zy∗ .
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at x∗ Assumption A.1. There exists a price p∗ ∈ L∗ (the topological dual of L), p∗ 6= 0, such that
−p∗ ∈
⋂
i∈M ∂dcl
(
Pi(x∗)
)(x∗i ).
Moreover, p∗ · ω > 0.
In the convex case, the conclusion of Theorem 3.4 means that for each consumer i, x∗i minimizes
p∗ ·xi over cl(Pi(x
∗)), while y∗ maximizes p∗ · y over the total production set Y . In the nonconvex
case, a) and b) express the first order conditions for these optimizing behaviours. In the spirit of
Debreu’s terminology, (x∗, y∗, p∗) will be called a quasi-valuation equilibrium.
Remark 3.7.
Recall that weak Pareto optimal allocations exist under several sets of assumptions on E . For
example, if each preference correspondence Pi derives from a complete preorder on Xi then Pareto
optimal allocations exist if for some vector space topology σ on L, AX(E) is a σ
m-compact sub-
set of
∏m
i=1Xi and the correspondences Pi have σ
m-open fibers in
∏m
i=1Xi.
8 If each preference
correspondence Pi is convex-valued then weak Pareto optimal allocations exist under the same
conditions, as an immediate consequence of the Browder-Fan theorem. For an exchange economy,
and if individual preferences on convex consumption sets can be represented by quasi-concave util-
ity functions, the two previous condition can be replaced by the weaker assumption that either the
“utility set” as defined by Mas-Colell in [22] or the “individually rational utility set” is a compact
subset of Rm.9 As far we know, a general study of the conditions of existence of weak Pareto
optimal allocations in the nonconvex and nontransitive case is missing.
In the application to infinite dimensional economic models, the vector space topology σ on L is
generally thought of as the weak topology σ(L,L∗) if L is reflexive, the weak-star topology σ(L,M)
if L has a Banach pre-dual M . The continuity condition put on preference correspondences is then
interpreted as an impatience condition. The main difficulty is with the σm-compactness of AX(E).
If L is an ordered Banach space and σ a topology such that order bounded sets are bounded,
boundedness of AX(E) is often guaranteed by the assumption that consumption sets are bounded
from below and the total production set is bounded from above. Note however that if L is a
Banach lattice with an order-continuous norm and if consumption sets are equal to L+, AX(E) is
σ(L,L∗)-compact if (Y + ω) ∩ L+ is σ(L,L
∗)-compact (see Theorem 4.2.4 in [1]).
This short survey of literature shows that the domain of application of decentralization results
that assume epi-Lipschitzianity of one of the preferred or production sets is the same as for Debreu
(54)’s result. It is restricted either to economies defined on an ordered topological vector commod-
ity space whose positive cone has a nonempty interior or to particular examples of economies which
have weak locally Pareto optimal allocation without order-boundedness assumptions on consump-
tion and total production sets. As proved in a previous version of this paper (see [11]), the same
remark holds for decentralization results which only assume the compactly epi-Lipschitzianity of
some preferred or production set at the corresponding component of the allocation,as soon as, in
order to guarantee the existence of weak Pareto optimal allocation, the compactly epi-Lipschitz
set is also assumed to be bounded from below or bounded from above.
8For a proof, see the proof of Theorem 1.5.3 in [1].
9When the individually rational utility set is compact, it is proved in [2] that E has Edgeworth equilibria, thus
weak Pareto optimal allocations. For nontransitive but convex valued preferences, a generalization of the Mas-Colell
condition can be found in [21].
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In counterpart, the main limitation of our results is in the assumption that the commodity space
is a Banach lattice. Supporting prices belong to the topological dual of L and it is well-known that
such prices may be of difficult economic interpretation if L is not reflexive. A natural application is
thus to nonconvex exchange or production economies defined on Lp spaces, 1 < p <∞. Extending
our results to topological vector commodity spaces which are not topological vector lattices10 is an
objective for future work.
4. Proofs
4.1. Characterization of properness for individual preferences. For the sake of generality,
let us say that a correspondence Pi : (L+)
m → L+ is vx∗
i
-proper at x∗i ∈ clPi(x
∗) with vx∗
i
> 0 in
L as properness vector if there exist δx∗
i
> 0, λx∗
i
> 0 and θx∗
i
> 0 such that
(4.1) L+ ∩
(
(Pi(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θx∗i )) + Γx∗i
)
⊂ Pi(x
∗)
where Γx∗
i
denotes the set Γx∗
i
:=
⋃
λ∈]0,λx∗
i
] λ
(
vx∗
i
+ δx∗
i
B
)
.
Proposition 4.1. The vx∗
i
-properness at x∗i of Pi, as stated above, is equivalent to the assumption
that Pi(x
∗) is the trace on L+ of some set, P̂i(x
∗), epi-Lipschitz at x∗i with respect to vx∗i , that is:
Pi(x
∗) = P̂i(x
∗) ∩ L+.
Proof. It is easy to prove that, as stated above, the vx∗
i
-properness at x∗i ∈ clPi(x
∗) of Pi(x
∗) is
implied by the fact that Pi(x
∗) is the trace on L+ of some set, P̂i(x
∗), epi-Lipschitz at x∗i with
respect to vx∗
i
. Let us assume conversely that Pi is vx∗
i
-proper at x∗i ∈ clPi(x
∗) and let us construct
such set P̂i(x
∗).
We can suppose that δx∗
i
≤ ‖vx∗
i
‖/2 and that θx∗
i
≤ λx∗
i
‖vx∗
i
‖/2. In view of this choice, we first
claim that one has
(4.2) Γx∗
i
∩B(0, θx∗
i
/2) ⊂ (1/2)Γx∗
i
.
Indeed, if x ∈ Γx∗
i
∩ B(0, θx∗
i
/2), then there exist some λ ∈]0, λx∗
i
]) and u ∈ B, such that x =
λ(vx∗
i
+ δx∗
i
u) with
θx∗
i
/2) ≥ ‖x‖ ≥ λ(‖vx∗
i
‖ − δx∗
i
) ≥ λ(‖vx∗
i
‖)/2.
Consequently, λ ≤ λx∗
i
/2 and x ∈ (1/2)Γx∗
i
.
We next define
P̂i(x
∗) = Pi(x
∗) ∪
((
Pi(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θx∗i /4)
)
+ Γx∗
i
)
.
In view of (4.1), P̂i(x
∗) ∩ L+ ⊂ Pi(x
∗) ⊂ P̂i(x
∗) ∩ L+, and it only remains to prove that P̂i(x
∗) is
epi-Lipschitz at x∗i with respect to vx∗i . We will prove more precisely that(
P̂i(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θx∗i /4)
)
+ (1/2)Γx∗
i
⊂ P̂i(x
∗).
Let z ∈ P̂i(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θx∗i /4). If z ∈ Pi(x
∗), by definition of P̂i(x
∗), the inclusion z + (1/2)Γx∗
i
⊂
P̂i(x
∗) is an obvious one. Otherwise, z ∈
(
Pi(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θx∗i /4)
)
+Γx∗
i
; the point z can be written
as x + γ, where x ∈ Pi(x
∗) ∩ B(x∗i , θx∗i /4) and γ ∈ Γx∗i . Since x and z are in B(x
∗
i , θx∗i /4),
γ ∈ B(0, θx∗
i
/2) thus, in view of (4.2), γ ∈ (1/2)Γx∗
i
, and x+ (1/2)Γx∗
i
⊂ P̂i(x
∗).
10An example of space of economic interest, used for modelling commodity differentiation, is
(M(K), σ(M(K), C(K))), the space of signed measures on a compact metric space K endowed with the weak-
star topology relative to its predual, the space C(K) of continuous real functions defined on K.
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4.2. Proof of Theorem 3.4. The proof is done in a sequence of claims that we shall establish
successively. The first claim and its proof are classical in the literature devoted to properness
assumptions.
Let δ = min{(δx∗
i
)i∈M , δy∗}. Using the notations of Definition 3.4, it is possible to choose some
θ > 0 satisfying for all i = 1, . . . ,m, B(x∗i , 2θ) ⊂ Ui and θ ≤ min{(θx∗i )i∈M , θy∗}. Moreover,
we will choose λ > 0, small enough (in particular smaller than min{(λx∗
i
)i∈M , λY , }) such that
Γ ⊂ B(0, θ), where Γ is defined by Γ =
⋃
λ∈]0,λ](λ/(m+ 1))(ω + δB).
Claim 4.1. ω /∈
∑
i∈M
(
(Pi(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θ)) + Γ
)
−
(
(Y ∩B(y∗, θ))− Γ
)
.
Proof of Claim 4.1. Otherwise, there exist xi ∈ Pi(x
∗) ∩ B(x∗i , θ), i = 1, . . . ,m, y ∈ Y ∩ B(y
∗, θ),
u ∈ B, λ : 0 < λ ≤ λ such that
∑
i∈M xi = (1− λ)ω + λδu+ y, which implies
λδu+ ≤
∑
i∈M
(xi + λ(1/(m+ 1))ω) + y
− + λ(1/(m+ 1))ω.
Using the decomposition property of vector lattices, we have λδu+ =
∑
i∈M si + sY with for each
i ∈ M , 0 ≤ si ≤ xi + λ(1/(m + 1))ω and 0 ≤ sY ≤ y
− + λ(1/(m + 1))ω. For each i ∈ M , we let
x′i = xi + λ(1/(m+ 1))ω − si, one has x
′
i ∈ L+ and∑
i∈M
x′i = ω + y − λ(1/(m+ 1))ω + (sY − λδu
−).
As |sY − λδu
−| ≤ sY ∨ λδu
− ≤ λδu+ ∨ λδu− ≤ λδ|u| ≤ λδy∗ |u| and
(
y − λ(1/(m+ 1))ω + (sY −
λδu−)
)+
≤ y+, it follows from A.2 that
∑
i∈M x
′
i ∈ ω + Y, hence that the consumption allocation
(x′i)i∈M ∈ AX(E). As for each i ∈ M , 0 ≤ si ≤ λδu
+ ≤ λδ|u| ≤ λδx∗
i
|u| and x′i ∈ L+, it follows
from A.1 that for each i ∈ M , x′i ∈ Pi(x
∗). From our choice of λ, for each i ∈ M , x′i ∈ Ui, which
contradicts the weak local Pareto optimality of (x∗, y∗).
Let us now define Γ˜ = (1/2)Γ. The two following claims are devoted to deduce from the first
one that ω ∈ bd
(∑
i∈M cl(Pi(x
∗) ∩B(x∗i , θ))− cl(Y ∩B(y
∗, θ)) + (m+ 1) cl Γ˜
)
.
Claim 4.2. Let (Qi)
m+1
i=1 be m+1 nonempty subsets of L. Then,
int
(
m+1∑
i=1
clQi + (m+ 1) cl Γ˜
)
⊂
m+1∑
i=1
(Qi + Γ).
Proof of Claim 4.2. Indeed, let us consider z ∈ int
(∑m+1
i=1 clQi + (m + 1) cl Γ˜
)
. By definition of
the interior, for an integer k large enough, z − (λ/(2k(m+ 1)))ω ∈
∑m+1
i=1 clQi + (m+ 1) cl Γ˜. By
definition of the closure,
∑m+1
i=1 clQi + (m+ 1) cl Γ˜ ⊂
∑m+1
i=1 Qi + (m+ 1)Γ˜ + (λδ/(2k(m+ 1)))B.
These two conditions together with the definition of Γ imply that
z ∈
m+1∑
i=1
Qi + (m+ 1)Γ˜ +
1
2k
λ
(m+ 1)
(ω + δB) ⊂
m+1∑
i=1
Qi + (m+ 1 +
1
k
)Γ˜.
By definition of Γ˜,
∑m+1
i=1 Qi + (m+ 1 + (1/k))Γ˜ ⊂
∑m+1
i=1 Qi + (m+ 1)Γ =
∑m+1
i=1 (Qi + Γ).
We will denote by Qi the set Pi(x
∗)∩B(x∗i , θ) (i = 1, . . . ,m) and by QY the set −Y ∩B(y
∗, θ).
Claim 4.3. ω ∈ bd
(∑
i∈M clQi + clQY + (m+ 1) cl Γ˜
)
.
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First, note that it follows from the hypothesis of local nonsatiation of preferences at each x∗i ,
contained in A.1, that ω ∈
∑
i∈M clQi + clQY + (m+ 1) cl Γ˜. Claim 4.1 together with Claim 4.2
applied to the sets Q1, . . . , Qm, QY lead to ω /∈ int
(∑
i∈M clQi + clQY + (m + 1) cl Γ˜
)
and the
conclusion holds.
Let now (εk) be a sequence of positive real numbers converging to 0. In view of Claim 4.3, we
can apply Theorem 2.1 (Theorem 1 of Borwein-Jofre´), in order to get for every k some pk ∈ X∗
such that
∀i ∈M, −pk ∈ ∂dclQi(x
k
i ) + ε
kB∗,
−pk ∈ ∂d−QY (−y
k) + εkB∗,
−pk ∈ ∂dcl eΓ(z
k) + εkB∗,
0 < c ≤ ‖pk‖ ≤ 1
where xki ∈ (x
∗
i + ε
kB), yk ∈ (y∗ + εkB), zk ∈ εkB and where c does not depend on k. Letting k
tend to infinity and by passing to subnets if necessary, we get pk
σ(X∗,X)
−→ p∗. It then follows from
the robustness of the subdifferential of the distance function that
∀i ∈M, −p∗ ∈ ∂dclQi(x
∗
i ), −p
∗ ∈ ∂d− clQY (−y
∗) and − p∗ ∈ ∂dcl eΓ(0).
At this stage, it is necessary to prove that p∗ 6= 0.
Claim 4.4. p∗ 6= 0.
Proof. Otherwise using the decomposition pk = −uk+vk, where uk ∈ ∂dcl eΓ(z
k) and vk ∈ εkB∗,
one has uk
σ∗(X∗,X)
−→ 0, and we will prove that it implies the norm-converges of uk to 0, which
contradicts that ‖pk‖ = ‖ − uk + vk‖ ≥ c > 0 since vk ∈ εkB∗. Using condition (c) on the
subdifferential, uk belongs to the classical normal cone of convex analysis at point zk. This means
that for all z ∈ cl Γ˜,
(4.3) uk · (z − zk) ≤ 0, or uk · z ≤ uk · zk.
Let us first remark that uk · zk → 0 since uk ∈ (1 + εk)B∗ and zk ∈ εkB. By definition of Γ˜, for
all u ∈ B, both (λ/(2(m+1))(ω− δu) and (λ/(2(m+1))(ω+ δu) are in cl Γ. For these points, the
inequality (4.3) allows to give explicit bounds on uk · u:
1
δ
(
uk · ω −
2(m+ 1)
λ
uk · zk
)
≤ uk · u ≤
1
δ
(
2(m+ 1)
λ
uk · zk − uk · ω
)
.
These inequalities together with the σ∗(X∗, X) convergence of (uk) to 0 and our first remark lead
to the norm convergence of (uk) to 0 and the conclusion holds.
Note that in view of the definitions of the sets Qi and QY , it follows that the functions dclQi and
dclPi(x∗) coincide on the ball B(x
∗
i , θ) and consequently using Property (b) of the subdifferential,
one gets −p∗ ∈ ∂dclPi(x∗)(x
∗
i ). Finally, using the properties (b) and (g) of the subdifferential, we
get: p∗ ∈ ∂dY (y
∗). As p∗ · cl Γ˜ ≥ 0, obviously p∗ · ω > 0
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4.3. Proof of Corollary 3.6. Let δ such that 0 < δ < min{(δx∗
i
)i∈M}. Using the notations of
Definition 3.4, it is possible to choose some θ > 0 satisfying for all i = 1, . . . ,m, B(x∗i , 2θ) ⊂ Ui
and θ ≤ min{(θx∗
i
)i∈M}. Moreover, we will choose λ > 0 small enough (in particular smaller than
min{(λx∗
i
)i∈M}) such that cl Γ ⊂ B(0, θ), where Γ denotes Γ =
⋃
λ∈]0,λ] λ((1/(m + 1))ω + δB).
Note that in view of our condition on δ, one has cl Γ ⊂ Γ∗i ∪ {0}.
We will construct an auxiliary economy with production, denoted by E ′ = ((Xi, Pi)i∈M , Y
′, ω)
whose production set Y ′ is equal to −(cl Γ ∩ L+).
We first state and prove Claims 4.5 and 4.6 in order to apply Theorem 3.4 to the allocation
(x∗, 0) for the economy E ′.
Claim 4.5. Assumption A.2 is satisfied at point y∗ = 0.
Proof of claim 4.5. First by construction, the set Y ′ is closed. We will prove that for all
y ∈ Y ′ ∩B(0, θ), if z ∈ (y − (1/2)Γ) ∩ {z ∈ L | z+ ≤ y+}, then z ∈ Y ′.
Since y ∈ Y ′, y+ = 0, and consequently z+ = 0, which signifies z ∈ −L+.
Since z = y − γ, where y ∈ Y ′ ∩ B(0, θ) and γ ∈ (1/2)Γ, from our choice on θ, it is immediate
to check that y ∈ (−1/2) cl Γ and consequently, z ∈ (−1/2) cl Γ− (1/2)Γ ⊂ − cl Γ.
Claim 4.6. The allocation (x∗, 0) is a weak local Pareto optimal allocation of the economy E ′.
Proof of claim 4.6. Indeed, otherwise there exists an allocation ((xi)i∈M , y) ∈ A(E) such that
for all i, xi ∈ Pi(x
∗) ∩ B(x∗i , θ). Letting for all i, x
′
i = xi − (1/m)y, recalling that Y
′ ⊂ −L+, the
points x′i are obviously in L+.
Since y ∈ −(cl Γ), one deduces that either y = 0 or y ∈ Γ∗i . If y = 0, then x
′
i = xi ∈ Pi(x
∗), and
otherwise since y ∈ Γ∗i , it follows from Assumption A.1 that x
′
i ∈ Pi(x
∗).
Finally by construction, one has x′i ∈ B(x
∗
i , 2θ) ⊂ Ui which contradicts the weak local Pareto
optimality of (x∗) in the exchange economy.
In view of Claims 4.5 and 4.6, one can apply Theorem 3.4 to get the existence of p∗ which satisfy
the conclusion of Corollary 3.6.
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